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1. As I have indicated elsewhere, I am skeptical about petitionary prayer. 
Among traditional theistic scriptures, the Christian ones say the most 
about petitionary prayers, but it seems to me that even those scriptures 
do not imply that God will answer any of my prayers. I also suspect 
that God’s freedom and goodness make it impossible for God’s actions 
to count as answers to petitionary prayers. Finally, I don’t think we can 
know whether God has answered particular prayers, and I don’t know 
what to ask for.1
By contrast, the Howard-Snyders defend the rationality of the 
practice of petitionary prayer through a series of clever and thoughtful 
arguments. Th ey say that God has good reasons to decree what they call 
an “institution of petitionary prayer” by deciding that some things will 
occur if and only if people pray for them. If God has in fact created such 
an institution, then there are some good things that God will not bring 
about if we don’t pray for them, so we’d better pray for them. But which 
things are they? Can we know? Should we pray only for those things? 
How specifi c and how earnest must our prayers be for those things 
before God will answer them? Th e Howard-Snyders leave unspecifi ed 
these aspects of the institution. But they argue anyway that it is valuable 
enough for God to decree because it would extend a good thing, namely, 
human responsibility for one’s own welfare and the welfare of others.2 In 
order to do this, they defend Richard Swinburne and Isaac Choi against 
criticisms that I have developed elsewhere.
1 Davison 2009.
2 Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, “Th e Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer”, European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2(2)2010, p. 51-2.
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2. Suppose that the Howard-Snyders were right that the institution of 
petitionary prayer would extend such responsibility. Would this show 
that the institution was “valuable enough” for God to decree? I don’t 
think so. Th e Howard-Snyders claim that our degree of responsibility “for 
the good that comes about through God’s granting our petitions might 
be quite substantial.”3 But responsibility is a two-edged sword: if people 
can deserve praise for answered prayers, then they can also deserve 
blame for not praying eff ectively. Th e belief that such blame might be 
appropriate (even if it isn’t in a particular case) can create signifi cant 
heartache for many people, especially since we cannot tell whether God 
would have acted diff erently had we prayed (or prayed diff erently). For 
many people, there is a great deal of anxiety about what to ask for and 
even a loss of confi dence in God due to unanswered prayers. Since some 
of the consequences of decreeing the institution of petitionary prayer 
would be bad for us, can we say that, on balance, it would be good for 
God to decree?
To make the points of this question more clear, compare the Howard-
Snyder’s suggestion about God’s increasing our responsibility for ourselves 
and others through decreeing the institution of petitionary prayer to 
other ways in which God might increase such responsibility, such as by 
increasing our power or our knowledge. For example, I suppose that 
God could have given us psychic powers that enabled us to move objects 
at a distance without contact, or extra-sensory perceptual abilities that 
would have permitted us to know things at a distance without using the 
fi ve senses. 4 Would it have been better for God to give us those abilities? 
Well, it depends, I suppose, on a huge number of factors. I would not 
presume to know either way. It would certainly extend our responsibility 
for ourselves and others, but all by itself, this does not show that it would 
be a good thing, all things considered.
So even if the Howard-Snyders have successfully defended Swinburne 
and Choi against my criticisms, this by itself would not show that the 
institution is valuable enough for God to decree, all things considered. 
I suppose that one could claim here that God is omniscient, and since 
3 “Th e Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer,” p. 61.
4 For a defense of the claim that some people actually possess such abilities, see 
Braude 2002 and 2003.
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God decreed it, it must have been valuable enough, all things considered. 
But then one would need to show that God has in fact decreed this 
institution, and many people (including many Christian theists) would 
share my skepticism about the prospects for success in that venture.
3. Do the Howard-Snyders successfully answer my criticisms of 
Swinburne and Choi? With regard to Swinburne, my conclusion was 
that “it seems unlikely that one is responsible (in any substantial sense) 
for the results of answered prayer.”5 Th e Howard-Snyders reconstructed 
my argument for this conclusion as follows:
1. It is impossible for one to reasonably believe that one’s petition was 
granted by God.
2. If it is impossible for one to reasonably believe that one’s petition 
was granted by God, then one is not responsible (in any substantial 
sense) for the results of God’s granting it.
3. So, one is not responsible (in any substantial sense) for the results 
of God’s granting one’s petition.6
My criticism of Swinburne was actually based on two of the three of the 
factors that (I claimed to) determine degrees of moral responsibility, not 
(just) my claim that it is impossible for one to reasonably believe that 
one’s petition was granted by God in retrospect. I said that
[I]n general, one’s degree of responsibility for the obtaining of some state of 
aff airs depends upon the degree to which one could foresee its obtaining, the 
degree to which one intended that it obtain as a result of one’s actions, and 
the degree to which one’s actions contributed causally to its obtaining. So 
cases in which one person petitions another person to act freely in specifi c 
ways over time, especially when one does not know the outcome of such 
petitions, are cases in which one’s responsibility for the obtaining of the state 
of aff airs in question is dramatically diminished.7
My point was that in the case of petitionary prayer, one cannot foresee 
the result and one barely causally contributes to it (if at all). Th e Howard-
5 Davison 2009, p. 296.
6 “Th e Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer,” p. 53.
7 Davison 2009, p. 296.
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Snyders off er a three part reply to my argument, and I should like to 
consider each part briefl y in turn.
5. Th e fi rst of the three replies is the “So What?” reply: 
But how does any of this imply that the institution of petitionary prayer does 
not extend human responsibility? We don’t see how. Aft er all, even if you are 
only somewhat responsible for your friend’s being healed, your free petition 
was necessary and suffi  cient for it given that the institution was in place. 
Th at’s responsibility enough.8
Th e claim that one’s petition was “necessary and suffi  cient” for the 
healing of one’s friend “given that the institution [of petitionary prayer] 
was in place” is intriguing. As I indicated above, the description of the 
institution that the Howard-Snyders give is not very detailed, so it is hard 
to know if this claim is true. (Does the institution include God’s specifi c 
intentions to answer specifi c prayers? If so, is this based on middle 
knowledge? What exactly does the institution include?) 
A more general worry with the argument here has to do with what 
counts as “enough” responsibility. We oft en talk about “the last straw,” 
implying that the last straw is the one that broke the camel’s back. Aft er 
all, given that the other straws were already in place on the camel’s back, 
this one last straw’s presence was necessary and suffi  cient for breaking 
the camel’s back. In Fred Dretske’s useful terminology, this last straw 
was a “triggering cause,” as opposed to a “structuring cause.”9 But this 
doesn’t mean that the last straw contributes causally to the breaking of 
the camel’s back more than any other straw does; they all make the same 
contribution (assuming that they have the same weight, of course). Th e 
contribution of the last straw is a salient one to us because it is the last 
straw, but we must keep this contribution in perspective. 
Suppose now that we complicate the picture a little bit. Imagine that 
there is a long line of people, each waiting to place a single straw on 
the camel’s back, one at a time. Suppose also that the person placing the 
fi nal straw cannot foresee that it will make any diff erence to the camel’s 
back. (Perhaps this person has no idea how much a pile of straw weighs, 
8 “Th e Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer,” p. 53.
9 Dretske 1988; also see Davison 1994.
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for instance, or how much straw a camel can carry.) Finally, imagine 
that the camel’s owner, who is standing next to the camel, also has 
a free choice about whether or not the camel will bear the full weight 
of the straws placed upon it. Now we have approximated more closely 
(but not exactly) the complicated situation described by the Howard-
Snyders as “the institution of petitionary prayer.” But it is not clear in 
this case that the person placing the last straw upon the camel’s back will 
have any signifi cant responsibility for the breaking of the camel’s back. 
Aft er all, this person will have no more responsibility for breaking the 
camel’s back than any of the other ten thousand or so people who laid 
straws on the camel’s back beforehand.10 Th is is important because the 
Howard-Snyders claim that even a slight extension of our responsibility 
for ourselves and others is “enough,” and it is not clear how much is 
enough, since it is not clear that the good consequences of decreeing 
the institution of petitionary prayer outweigh the bad ones (as noted 
above).
6. Th e second of the three replies in defense of Swinburne involves the 
Howard-Snyders taking issue with my epistemological claim that apart 
from direct revelation, it is impossible to know whether or not a given 
prayer has been answered – or at least one of them does this, since 
they disagree on this point. I have developed some new arguments to 
support my conclusion here, but this is not the place to introduce them, 
so I will let the Howard-Snyders continue to debate this question with 
one another. If the one who agrees with me can persuade the other one 
to agree with me, though, it means that the foresight condition on moral 
responsibility probably cannot be satisfi ed (apart from direct revelation, 
of course: for more on foresight and responsibility, see below).
7. Finally, in the third of three replies in defense of Swinburne, the 
Howard-Snyders suppose, for the sake of the argument, that I am right 
in thinking that the foresight condition cannot be met, but then argue 
10 I am not assuming here that responsibility is like a pie that must be divided; 
I recognize that two people can be fully responsible for the same thing (as Zimmerman 
argues persuasively in Zimmerman 1985). My point is that all of the participants are 
equally responsible to the same degree, and this degree is very small because each one 
makes a very small causal contribution to the outcome.
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that signifi cant responsibility is still possible. Th ey off er two arguments 
for this conclusion. Th e fi rst involves the startling claim that the causal 
contribution that you might make in a case of answered petitionary 
prayer “won’t be signifi cantly less than the degree to which you contribute 
causally in bringing about various mundane states of aff airs.” Th ey 
say that
Th is is not surprising; aft er all, your freely asking is necessary and suffi  cient 
for her being healed, given that the institution of petitionary prayer is in 
place. To be sure, you didn’t set the institution in place, but then we didn’t 
set in place the standing conditions that allow us to contribute causally 
to the way the world is. Indeed, it seems we had no greater infl uence on 
those conditions than the institution in question, in which case it seems 
that the degree to which your asking contributes causally to your friend’s 
being healed is no less than the degree to which a particular act of yours 
contributes causally to, say, the tennis ball’s landing a winner or the sockeye 
and zucchini being grilled to perfection.11
Now I have no analysis of causal contribution to off er, but it seems 
obvious to me that the degrees of causal contribution described here 
are very diff erent. Knowing whether or not something is necessary 
or suffi  cient relative to certain standing conditions will not permit us 
to determine, all by itself, degrees of causal contribution. Th e case of 
the last straw’s breaking the camel’s back illustrates this point.12 Other 
traditional theists are quick to distance themselves from the view that 
petitionary prayer is eff ective in the same way that a magical spell might 
be, presumably because God is a person, God is free, and God is not 
obligated to answer particular prayers.13 But the claim that a petitionary 
prayer is necessary and suffi  cient for a result (given that the institution is 
in place) sound very much like what we would say about the effi  cacy of 
11 “Th e Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer,” p. 60.
12 In addition, my degree of causal contribution to the particular details of the 
tennis ball’s landing a winner or the food’s being grilled to perfection at a given time 
(the “triggering causes,” as Dretske would say) depends on prior development of skills 
(some of the “structuring causes” at work here, as Dretske would say); also, there is no 
intervening free agent involved in these cases. For more on this, see below.
13 On this point, see Philips 1981, chapter 6, Swinburne 1998, p. 115, and Flint 1998, 
p. 222. 
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a magical spell. (Of course, from this it does not follow that a petitioner 
would be responsible for nothing at all in the case of an answered prayer; 
for more on this question, see below.)
Th e second argument for the conclusion that responsibility can be 
signifi cant involves an appeal to an example in which a man plugs a leak 
at a nuclear facility, where the method used to seal the leak is notoriously 
unreliable. And I agree with them that in general, it is possible to be 
substantially responsible for something to which one makes a substantial 
causal contribution, even if one cannot foresee the result with much 
confi dence. So foresight is not necessary for responsibility. But from this 
it does not follow that the petitioner is responsible in any substantial 
sense for whatever God brings about in response to petitionary prayer. 
To show this, we would need a suffi  cient condition for responsibility, and 
an argument for the conclusion that this suffi  cient condition would be 
satisfi ed in such a case. I remain skeptical about the prospects of success 
for such an argument. For all of these reasons, I do not fi nd this defense 
of Swinburne persuasive. Th is completes my brief survey and response 
to the Howard-Snyders’ three-fold reply to my criticisms of Swinburne.
8. Th e Howard-Snyders also defend Isaac Choi’s suggestion that 
petitionary prayers can be acts of love for other people. (Th eir reply 
to my argument is brief, so my reply to their reply will be brief also.) 
Th ey do this by describing a case in which aft er initially deciding not 
to perform a life-saving surgery for her own reasons, a doctor freely 
chooses to perform the surgery in response to her husband’s persuasion. 
In this case, they say, the husband is either a cause of his wife’s action 
(assuming causation need not necessitate) or is partly responsible for his 
wife’s action (assuming causation does indeed necessitate). Either way, 
though, the husband deserves some credit for his wife’s action.
I should say instead that if the wife acts freely, then the husband 
is responsible for a number of things, including the fact that the wife 
reconsiders her decision in light of his persuasion, makes a decision of 
some kind, etc., but the husband is not responsible for her actual decision 
or its subsequent eff ects. Aft er all, consider a possible world that is exactly 
like the one described by the Howard-Snyders except that the doctor 
considers carefully her husband’s reasons and then decides instead not to 
perform the surgery in question. In that possible world, the husband is 
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responsible for exactly the same things as in the original situation – aft er 
all, he performs the same actions (makes the same causal contributions 
with the same intentions and foresight) in both worlds.14 Th e diff erences 
between the worlds are due to the wife’s decision, which is up to her. 
I should like to say the same thing in this case that I said about the case 
of petitionary prayer: if God answered X’s petitionary prayer to help Y, 
then God would be the one responsible for the act of love that makes 
a diff erence to Y, whereas X would be responsible only for the petition 
(which itself might be an act of love, of course).
9. In the rest of their paper, the Howard-Snyders defend the practice 
of petitionary prayer against a puzzle (which they call “the puzzle of 
petitionary prayer”).15 Th ey do this by advancing two claims. Th e fi rst 
is that (1) Sometimes it would be better for God to do something in 
response to a request than to do it without being requested to do so. 
Th is claim is plausible, and probably dissolves the puzzle, but at best, it 
would explain the rationality of petitionary prayer only when this would 
be true. Should we pray only in cases that appear to be like this? Th at 
doesn’t seem right, especially since we don’t know whether particular 
cases are like this.
For example, should I ask God to heal SS, the mother of fi ve young 
children in my parish who has brain cancer? I guess so – it seems like it 
would be good – but I’m not sure. I don’t know why God would allow her 
to get brain cancer in the fi rst place. Maybe there’s something else going 
on here, something I don’t see, maybe something that has nothing to do 
with me or with SS. (See the book of Job.) Would it be better for God to 
heal SS in response to someone’s request than to do it without having 
been asked? I don’t know; I can’t tell; it depends on the details.
Perhaps (1) suggests that I have something like a Pascalian wager-type 
reason to pray: for all I know, SS’s healing might hinge on my prayer, so 
I should pray – the possible payoff  justifi es the small cost. (Something like 
this actually does motivate me to pray occasionally, when I’m desperate. 
We seem to ask for help only when we have no other live options; nobody 
asks God to pass the salt.) But this reasoning would lead me to pray all 
14 For more on this kind of argument, see Davison 1999.
15 “Th e Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer,” p. 45.
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the time for every important thing for everyone, and that’s too much; 
I have other things I need to do. (Someone might say, “Trust in God – 
He would not require so much;” I would reply: “Yes, trust in God – He 
would not require petitions at all.”) Th is pragmatic reason for praying 
also seems incompatible with the idea that one must pray earnestly in 
faith, but I cannot pursue that idea here.
10. Th e second claim advanced by the Howard-Snyders to defuse the 
puzzle is based on Geoff rey Cupit’s arguments. It is this: (2) Sometimes 
requests create new obligations in God, which can tip the scales of 
God’s reasons in favor of doing what is requested. I fi nd this claim to be 
implausible. Cupit claims that requests generate new obligations which 
are independent of the requestee’s existing reasons for doing something. 
But contrary to what Cupit’s account would predict, petitionary prayers 
typically try to highlight God’s existing reasons for acting. Very rarely do 
people seem to think that they can create a new obligation for God simply 
by asking, and when they do, we are very suspicious of them. (Th ink 
of televangelists who promise to bring our requests directly to God, for 
a small fee.) I think that’s because we feel that God is not obligated to us 
in the way that other humans are. 
Cupit may be right that we have defeasible obligations to regard 
requests from other humans as reasons to act, but these are oft en defeated. 
Imagine that a young child asks a competent scientist to do something 
entertaining with an expensive and powerful piece of equipment instead 
of fi nishing an important experiment. We would expect the scientist to 
treat the child with respect, but not to consider seriously the request, 
since there is too much at stake and the scientist already knows what 
is best to do in this situation. If the divine/human situation is like this 
one, and I suspect that it is, then I doubt that our prayers, via Cupit’s 
mechanism, could generate any new obligations for God, especially 
where serious things are at stake.
Suppose that I am wrong about Cupit. Still, even if the Howard-
Snyders are right about requests creating divine obligations, this will help 
to explain the rationality of off ering petitionary prayers only in cases in 
which God’s reasons for doing something were roughly equal to God’s 
reasons for not doing it. But how oft en does that occur? (Is SS’s case like 
this?) I have no idea. Cupit says that the obligation created by a request is 
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defeated if the request is for a bad thing; perhaps my petitionary prayers 
are all defeated in this way. I have no way of knowing if this is so. Once 
again, my only reason for praying seems to be a wager, and it’s not a very 
strong one.
11. At one point, the Howard-Snyders consider the idea that we could 
receive all of the benefi ts of the institution of petitionary prayer if we 
simply believed, falsely, that it was in place. Th ey reject this idea by 
criticizing two possible ways in which it might be true. But they do 
not consider the possibility that some people misinterpreted particular 
events long ago, sincerely believed in answered prayer on that basis, 
and passed along this false belief innocently to others over many years. 
Belief in the institution would be reinforced by the “self-serving bias,” 
an apparently robust psychological tendency to attribute good things to 
one’s own eff orts, even if such attribution is not deserved. It would also 
give people a sense of control when all of their normal resources failed. 
As far as I can tell, this explanation of the belief in the institution of 
petitionary prayer might well be the correct one. 
In the end, I don’t think that the Howard-Snyders have provided 
a very strong rationale for engaging in the practice of petitionary prayer, 
especially in light of other puzzles that they do not address here. But as 
I said at the beginning, I was already skeptical about petitionary prayer 
from the start. Still, I always fi nd the Howard-Snyders’s work to be 
provocative, insightful, and helpful, so I will always look forward to the 
work that they do in this area.
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